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THE SUPREME COURT IN FLAMES:
FIRE INSURANCE DECISIONS AFTER
KOSMOPO ULOS ©
By

REUBEN A. HASSON*

This article examines three recent Supreme Court of
Canada decisions on fire insurance after the historic
Kosmopoulos decision. In all three cases, the author
finds a distressing lack of concern with relevant
statutory provisions, policy arguments, and precedent.
Responsibility for this deplorable state of affairs must
be shared between the Court and counsel. Insurance
law is a very complex body of law, deserving as much
care as that of, say, the law of the Charter.

Cet article examine trois arrets r6cents de la Cour
supreme du Canada sur l'assurance-incendie apras
l'arrat historique de Kosmopoulos. Dans les trois
arr~ts, l'auteur constate un manque de souci
decourageant i l'6gard des dispositions des lois,
arguments politiques et prdc4dents. La responsabilit6
pour cette situation deplorable doit se partager entre ]a
Cour et les avocats. Le droit de l'assurance est un
domaine tres complexe qui m6rite autant d'attention
que, disons, le droit de la Charte.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Insurance Co.,1 the Supreme

Court of Canada allowed a plaintiff, who owned all of the shares in a
company, but who had insured the company's property in his own name
rather than in the company's name, to recover on the policy from the
insurer when the property was destroyed by fire.2 This seemingly
obvious result was produced by the most impressive insurance law
decision the Supreme Court has given in its entire history. The Court
examined the precedents carefully and critically. The relevant academic
writings were put to intelligent use and the policy issues in the case were
meticulously examined. To some commentators, it seemed difficult to
believe that this was the same Court whose previous insurance decisions,
until then, had displayed a lack of learning and had resolutely failed to
address any of the policy issues at stake.
The purpose of this article is to show that, in three decisions
since Kosmopoulos, the Court has returned to its old ways and to explain
why this might be so. In fact, these decisions may be worse than any of
the insurance decisions from 1875-1980. Before discussing these three
cases in detail, the significance of the Kosmopoulos decision must be
examined: first, to show its significance; and second, because it is

1 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2, aff'g (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 428 (C.A.), aff'g [1981] I.L.R. 539 (Ont. S.C.)
[hereinafter Kosmopoulos]. Wilson J. gave a judgment on behalf of five members of the court;
McIntyre J. would simply have reversed the decision in Macaura v. NorthernAssurance Co., [1925]

AXC. 619 (H.L.).
2 For comments on the lower court decisions, see J.S. Ziegel, "Shareholder's Insurable
Interest-Another Attempt to Scuttle the Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Doctrine:
Kosmopoulos v. Northern Assurance Co." (1984) 62 Can. Bar Rev. 95; M.G. Baer, Annotation
(1983), 1 C.C.L.I. 83; and L. Stuesser, "Insurable Interest: The Supreme Court of Canada Adopts
the Factual Expectancy Test, 1987-88" (1987-88) 13 C.B.LJ. 226, who points out that the case did
not have a happy ending. Stuesser writes, at 228 [citations omitted]:
The Supreme Court's final judgment was delivered almost 10 years after the fire that gave
rise to the action. What has happened to Mr. Kosmopoulos in the interim? The story is
not a happy one. He managed to reopen the store without the benefit of insurance
money. He borrowed. He eventually was forced to sell his home. In 1980, was forced to
close the store. Mr. Kosmopoulos, a former self-employed small businessman, turned to
a factory job.
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I propose to examine, that of Scott v.
relevant to the first of three cases
3
Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF KOSMOPOULOS
In any system of law that recognizes the existence of private

property, it will be necessary to distinguish insurance from wagering or
betting.4 Legitimate insurance involves the protection of property, the

destruction of which causes loss to the insured.5 Usually, the insured will
own or have some other property interest in the property which is

damaged or destroyed, but this need not be so. The insured may seek to
insure public property, such as a road, damage to which would cause him
or her loss. 6 Similarly, a lender of money for the construction of a

property will want to be able to insure the property against loss. 7 When
wagering, one is not seeking to protect against economic loss; the object
here is to make a windfall gain. Thus, suppose I am convinced that a
building, in whose damage or destruction I have no interest beyond that

of any other citizen, will collapse within a year. If I enter into a contract
with an insurer to pay me $50,000 if the building collapses within a year,

and it does, I cannot collect from the insurer, however formal my
contract may appear to be. The court will deny me the $50,000 because I
3 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1445 [hereinafter Scott]. For an effective criticism of this decision, see N.
Rafferty, "Developments in Contract and Tort Law: The 1988-89 Term" (1990) 1 Supreme Court
L.R. (2d) 269 at 311-18; for an earlier critique, see M.G. Baer, "Recent Developments in Canadian
Law: Insurance Law" (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 631 at 643-48.
4 But see the comments of L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection, vol. 1 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1982) at 27, para. 4.04 [citations omitted], showing that the line is not absolutely clear:
Another problem that has caused difficulty in recent months is that of distinguishing
between legitimate investments and unenforceable gaming contracts. The public have
been offered arrangements ranging from betting on whether the quoted price of a listed
stock on an index (such as the FT Index) will rise or fall to entrusting a capital sum to a
company to invest and to use the income to bet on race horses. On the face of it, all of
these seem more akin to gaming and wagering contracts and therefore unenforceable.
On the other hand, in the former type the objectives of the participants may be
indistinguishable from those when purchasing options or futures. To treat them as
gaming contracts would be the worst possible way of protecting investors. The Act must
5 The classic article is by B. Harnett & J.V. Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A
Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept" (1948) 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1162.
6 Farmers'Mutual Insurance Co. v. New Holland Turnpike Road Co., 122 Pa. 37 (1888), which
held that there was no insurable interest.
7 Guarantee Co. of North America v. Acqua-Land Exploration Ltd., [1966] S.C.R. 133
[hereinafter Guarantee].
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am betting. Although the courts, at one time, enforced wagering
agreements with some enthusiasm, 8 they do not do so at the present
time.9
All this seems elementary. If the courts had followed the
decision of Lawrence J. in Lucena v. Craufurd,1°the line would have
been clear. In that case, the Judge held that an insured could recover if
she suffered "factual expectation of loss." Unfortunately, Lawrence J.
had the misfortune to sit with Eldon L.C. who sought to improve
Lawrence J.'s definition of insurable interest by requiring that, in
addition to a loss, the plaintiff must have a "legal or equitable interest"
in the property. Eldon L.C. sought to show that if Lawrence J.'s
definition of "insurable interest" were to prevail an ordinary seaman
would be able to insure the ship in which he sailed. The fact that seamen
did not earn enough to do this does not seem to have occurred to Eldon
L.C., who seems to have made delay, rather than common sense, the
touchstone of his insurance decisions. 1 1 Having insured the ship in
which he had sailed, the sailor would then (in Eldon L.C.'s logic) seek to
insure the next ship in which he sailed, and so on, ad infinitum. The
point here is that no seaman would have had the resources to insure any
ship. Moreover, the insurer of the ship would only want to deal with the
master (or owner) of the ship. Unfortunately, it was Eldon L.C.'s test
that many
rather than Lawrence J.'s that was to prevail, with the result
12
bets.
unenforceable
as
treated
were
insurances
legitimate
A. TurningInsurance Contractsinto Wagers
Under Eldon L.C.'s test, buyers of goods had no insurable
interest unless they could show either that they would have received

8 See, for example, March v. Pigot (1771), 5 Burr. 2802, 98 E.R. 471 (K.B.) (wager on
survivorship of fathers of the wagerers); and Hussey v. Crickit (1811), 3 Camp. 168, 170 E.R. 1343
(C.P.) (wager on who was older).
9 See supranote 4.
10 (1806), 2 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) 269, 127 E.R. 630 (C.P.) [hereinafter Lucena], aff'd (1808), 1
Taunt. 325, 127 E.R. 858 (H.L.).
11 See the essay by W. Hazlitt, "Lord Eldon and Mr. Wilberforce" in W. Hazlitt, The Spirit of
the Age (Menston, Eng.: Scolar Press, 1971) at 234. Hazlitt writes of Eldon L.C., at 238: "He
delights to balance a straw, to see a feather turn the scale or make it even again, and divides and
subdivides a scruple to the smallest fraction.... Delay seems, in his mind, to be of the very essence of
justice!'
12
See Gower, supranote 4 at 27.
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specific performance 1 3 or that property in the goods had passed to
them. 1 4 It is true that terms such as cash insurance freight (CF) and
freight on board (FOB) removed many uncertainties here, but there were
still many unresolved problems. In cases where the plaintiff had to
demonstrate either the availability of specific performance or the
passage of property as a basis for obtaining an insurable interest, it
would frequently require a trial and an appeal to determine these
questions. A lender who lent money for a construction project would
have no insurable interest, unless he or she had taken out a security
interest in the property is Unsecured creditors had no insurable interest
16
in the property.
In Kosmopoulos, the Supreme Court, by adopting Lawrence J.'s
test of "factual expectation" of loss in Lucena, made it possible for these
(and other) insureds to recover.1 7 Before the decision in Kosmopoulos,
the subject of insurable interest had been a bonanza for insurers and
examiners in insurance law. For the ordinary citizen, who was legally
unadvised or advised incompetently, the law presented a trap. It was a
disgrace that judges and lawyers had to read hundreds of pages of
judicial decisions before they could advise on whether the contract was
enforceable.1 8 If the Kosmopoulos case did not consign libraries to the
scrap heap, it relegated many arcane decisions to the junk heap. No
other Canadian decision in insurance law has had that beneficial effect.
Those commentators who thought that Kosmopoulos represented a new
approach by the Supreme Court to the resolution of insurance problems
were soon gravely disappointed.

13 In Canadian law, specific performance is very seldom decreed outside of contracts for the
disposition of interests in land.
14 Although a reading of the Ontario Sale of GoodsAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1, s. 19, regarding
the passing of property, leads one to believe that property passes once the contract is made, either

shipment or delivery is generally necessary to transfer property. See, for example, CarlosFederspiel
& Co. S.A. v. Charles Twigg& Co., [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 240 (Q.B.).
15 See Guarantee,supra note 7.
16 See generally E.W. Patterson & HJ. McIntyre, "Unsecured Creditor's Insurance" (1931) 31
Colum. L. Rev. 212.
17

See Clark v. Scottish ImperialInsurance Co. (1879), 4 S.C.R. 192.
18 In just over twenty years, three decisions on insurable interest were heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada: Guarantee,supra note 7; Wandlyn Motels Ltd v. Commerce GeneralInsurance Co.,

[1970] S.C.R. 992; and Kosmopoulos, supra note 1. In addition, there were scores of provincial
decisions both at the appellate level and at first instance: see D. Dumais, InsurableInterest in
PropertyInsuranceLaw (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1986).
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1. Visiting the sins of the children on their parents: Scott v. Wawanesa
Insurance Co.19
Since at least the middle of the nineteenth century, all members
of the insured family living in their home were listed as insureds in home
insurance policies. This did not mean that they all owned the property.
For one thing children could not own property, nor could women at that
date.20 The purpose of listing the wife and children as insureds was to
protect their personal property. If they did not list their personal
property, they ran afoul of what is now section 148(2) of the Ontario
InsuranceAct 2 1 The notion that if the spouse's child burned down the
house then the owners would be disqualified was not argued until 1979.
In the following year, it was successfully argued that a wife, even if she
was not listed as an insured, who set fire to the matrimonial home,
disqualified both herself and her innocent spouse from recovery.
In Rankin v. North Waterloo FarmersMutualInsurance Co.,22 the
Ontario Court of Appeal had to decide whether a fire started by a
retarded sixteen-year-old son of the parents, all of whom were described
as the insureds in the policy, defeated the right of the parents to recover.
In a fine opinion, Weatherston J.A. canvassed English, Canadian, and
American decisions and showed that the case law in these jurisdictions
refused to deprive an insured of coverage because of the misconduct of a
co-insured. The British Columbia Supreme Court, two years after
Rankin was decided, held that, although a wife who set fire to her
husband's property was not listed as an insured, she destroyed his right
Scott case was decided by the
to the property as well.23 By the time the
25 and Newfoundland courts 26
Ontario
the
Supreme Court in 1989,24
19 Supra note 3.
20 See C.B. Backhouse, "Married Women's Property in Nineteenth-Century Canada," (1988)
6 Law & Hist. Rev. 211.
21 R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8.
22 (1980), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 564 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Rankin].
23 See Wiens v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of Canada, [1981] I.L.R. 443 (B.C.S.C.)
[hereinafter Wens].
24
Supra note 3.
25 See Rankin,supra note 22; and Higgins v. Orion Insurance Co. (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 352
(C.A.), regarding partnership.
26 See Murdock v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (1981), 30 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 311 (Nfld,
S.C.); and Walsh v. CanadianGeneral Insurance Co. (1988), 70 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 89 (Nfld. S.C.). In
these two cases, the Newfoundland Courts used the Fire InsuranceAct, R.S.N. 1970, c. 30, s. 11(b)
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whereas the courts of British Columbia
protected the innocent party,
27
penalized the innocent party.

We have seen that the rationale for listing dependent children
and non-owning spouses as insureds in the policy was to protect their
personal property. A different rationale for this rule was offered by
Larry Gilbertson in the Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures
on Insurance in 1987.28 According to Gilbertson, "[o]ne of the practical
reasons for this exclusion is that there is so much potential for collusion
between assureds. It may be very difficult to obtain evidence to prove
the complicity of the other assured or assureds."29 The same Eldonlike 0 thinking was echoed in the Wawanesa Insurance Co.'s factum
before the Supreme Court of Canada. The factum stated in part:
The exclusion of the coverage for the deliberate acts of members of the Scott household
is in no way unreasonable.... He (a member of the household) has inside knowledge of
the times at which the house will be empty. He can be seen loitering about the property
without attracting attention. In addition, he is subject to family and personal pressures
from other members of the household which may provide a motive for arson absent in
outsiders:3 1

Unfortunately, this rationale for disqualifying all insureds, after a
fire had been started by a fifteen year old living at home, was not
addressed by the appellant's factum in the Scott case. Nor did the
Supreme Court deal with this alleged reason for the clause. In fact, the
rationale is absurd2 2 A dishonest insured would most likely look for a
professional arsonist to do the job. The professional arsonist33will
provide skill and divert suspicion from the owner of the property If
insureds employ their teenagers to set fire to the matrimonial home
there is a serious risk that the job will be botched, and that the youth will
(now R.S.N. 1990, c. F-10,s. 11(b)) to nullify an "unreasonable" term in a fire insurance policy. For
the corresponding Ontario provision, see the InsuranceAct, supranote 21, s. 151(b).
27 See Wiens, supra note 23; and Zouzounas v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada (1984), 5
C.C.L.I. 207 (B.C.S.C.).
28 See "Multiple Assureds: Does the Wrongdoing of One Contaminate the Rights of the
Innocent?" in Law Society of Upper Canada, SpecialLectureson InsuranceLaw (Toronto: L.S.U.C.,
1987)211.
29 ibid.
30

Seesupranotes 10-12 and accompanying text.

31 Respondent's Factum, Scott, supranote 3, File No. 20161, on file with the Supreme Court of
Canada at 5.
32 In the voluminous literature on insurable interest in'property over two centuries, I know of
no writer or judge who has advanced the possibility of disqualifying all insureds in this context.
33 Even if the adult insured commits arson, he or she will often see to it that the property is
overinsured: see Harnett & Thornton, supranote 5 at 1183.
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suffer serious injury, or death, particularly if the teenager is mentally
retarded, or disturbed 3 4 Even if successful, there is the risk that the
youth will be indiscreet and boast of his or her prowess.
The respondent's factum cited Bryant,35 a case in which the
husband had burned down the matrimonial home. A United States
District Court, applying Kentucky law, held that the wife was not entitled
to recover. In the course of his opinion, Bertelsman D.J. held, denying
recovery to the wife, that "[t]o accept the emotionally appealing
argument of the plaintiff would be to rewrite the policy and impose upon
the insurance company a risk that it did not insure."3 6 By citing this
case, the respondent made it appear that Kentucky law, and those states
that follow the same rule, represents the American position. In fact, as
one might expect, the American cases are split, with a majority giving
protection to the innocent spouse, (or to innocent spouses, where the
fire had been started by their child(ren)). 37 The appellant's factum does
not cite a single American authority, and many of the authorities cited
have nothing to do with the protection of joint interests.38 In citing the
old law about the role of the court's function being to interpret, rather
than rewrite the policy, the respondent's factum must have struck a
sympathetic chord with all members of the Supreme Court. It is
anathema for the courts to admit that they rewrite insurance contracts,
even though they frequently do.39

34

This was the situation in the Rankin case: see supra note 22 and accompanying text.

35

Bryant v. Allstate Insurance Co., 592 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Ky. 1984) [hereinafter Btyant].
36 Ibid.at 41.
37 Inrecent years, a majority of jurisdictions have allowed the innocent party to recover: see
R.E. Keeton & A.I. Widiss, InsuranceLaw (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1988) at 516 [citations omitted],
who write:
[I]t is generally recognized that when a structure is destroyed as the result of arson
committed by someone who has no connection with the insured owner, fire insurance will
provide indemnification for the owner. Furthermore, the concept underlying such
decisions-that the loss is a fortuity from the vantage point of the insured-has been
extended to an innocent insured when a fire was intentionally set by a co-owner of a
property who was also an insured.
38

Two of the five cases cited deal with the law of insurable interest before Kosmopoulos,supra
note 1. The factum does not cite the relevant Canadian authorities on the subject.
39 See, for recent examples, Inn. Cor InternationalLtd. v. American Home Assurance Co.

(1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 64 (C.A.); and Wigle v. Allstate Insurance Co. of Canada (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 101
(C.A.).
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a) Scott v. WawanesaInsurance Co.: The opinions
At first instance, Wood- J. refused to give judgment for the
insurer.40 He followed Rankin 41 which had canvassed fully the American
authorities. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a judgment by
McDonald J.A.,42 sought to extend the rationale of Kosmopoulos to the
point of absurdity; in its view, young Scott "would benefit by the
continued existence of the dwelling."43 But this alone cannot be enough
to give a teenager living at home an insurable interest. On the same
basis, friends of the Scott family, who occasionally visited the Scotts,
would be able to insure the Scott's home. This is not the kind of interest
that Kosmopoulos intended to give. The second ground given by the
Court was that the clause was unambiguous:
It is unnecessary to decide whether the indemnification obligation is joint or several. The
exclusionary clause is unambiguous. Assuming the position more [sic] favourable to the
exclusionary clause bars recovery where the loss is
respondents, that it is several, the 44
caused by a wilful act of the insured.

The Court of Appeal's finding that the exclusionary clause 4is
5
unambiguous is startling in view of the fact that both Canadian courts
and American courts46 are evenly divided on its interpretation. Indeed,
when it decided the appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada itself split 4-3
on the interpretation of an allegedly unambiguous clause.
A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
47 L'Heureux-Dub6 J. stressed the
British Columbia Court of Appeal.
same two factors that had been relied upon by the Court of Appeal.
Once again, Kosmopoulos was inflated beyond its proper scope. In the
majority's words:
even if we were to accept the more narrow definition suggested by the appellants, it
would be impossible to say that the insurable interest of the infant Charles Scott was

40 (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 752 (B.C.S.C.).
41
Supra note 22.
42 (1988), 30 D.L.R. (4th) 414 (B.C.C.A.).
43

Ibkd at 418.

44

IbU at 420.
See supra notes 25-27.

45

46 See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
47 Scott, supranote 3. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. gave the judgment of the majority with McIntyre J.,
Lamer J. (as he then was), and Wilson J.concurring. La Forest J.gave a dissenting opinion with
Dickson CJ. (as he then was) and Sopinka J. concurring.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 33 NO. 4

limited to his personal possessions. He had a direct relationship to the family home and
its contents, since they were his source of accommodation and support.4 8

An insurable interest is not, as the majority seems to think, something
that can be thrust on an individual, to that person's disadvantage. The
whole concept of insurable interest is meant to benefit an insured, who,
consciously, seeks to protect some property, the damage or destruction
of which, will prejudice the insured. The teenage Scott neither intended
to protect the property he was living in, nor did he have the contractual
capacity to do so. Having rescued the law of insurable interest from a
morass of absurdity in Kosmopoulos, two years later the same Court has
created a different swamp for the concept.
La Forest J. gave a convincing dissenting judgment for the
minority. He rightly stressed that the purpose of adding teenagers as
insureds was to protect their personal property. This judgment has since
come in for sharp criticism from de Grandpr649 as reflecting the poor
quality of recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions. For de Grandpr6,
the minority violated "la doctrine classique"5 0 which was well-stated, in
his view, in MacGillivray& Parkingtonon InsuranceLaw:
A Court will not require the parties to have reached separate agreement on the terms of
the insurance apart from the essential terms described above. When an applicant seeks
insurance over from a particular insurer, he impliedly offers to take an insurance on the
insurers usual or standard terms of cover.51

The notion that a policy only has one meaning is not classical, or any
other kind of, law; words of a policy can be read in different ways and
this has always been the case. De Grandpr6, when he was on the bench,
found that the interpretation of insurance policies by appellate courts
were sometimes wrong, and then for good measure, introduced
sociological factors to justify his decision.
In Commonwealth
Construction Co. v. Imperial Oil Ltd.,5 2 the principal contractor and the
subcontractor were insured as co-insureds. The Alberta Supreme Court
(Appeal Division), nevertheless, held that the principal contractor could
sue the subcontractor for damage caused by it, to the principal
contractor. Writing for the Supreme Court, de Grandpr6 J. reversed the
48Iid. at 1467.
49 See L.-P. de Grandpr6, "La Cour Suprame du Canada: Ses Jugements Rdcents en
Assurance" (1993) 61 Assurances 31.
501]bid. at34.
51
bid. at 35, citing M. Parkington, MacGillivrayand Parkinglon on Insurance Law, 8th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) at 90-91.
52 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 317, rev'g (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 399 (Alta. S.C. (A.D.)).
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court below. In reaching his conclusion, he stressed the inconvenience
and delay that would be caused on a building site, if the various parties
could sue one another. 53 This is a radically bolder decision than the
dissent of the minority in Scott. It appears, therefore, that de Grandpr6
does not, himself, take the "doctrine classique" too seriously.
Another disappointing feature of Scott is that Wilson J., who
wrote the court's opinion in Kosmopoulos, subscribed to the majority
view in Scott. Unlike her truly radical decision in Kosmopoulos, the
decision in Scott is purely formalistic. In her well-known Betcherman
lecture,54 Wilson J.spoke of areas of the law where:
the principles and the underlying premises are so firmly entrenched and so fundamentally

sound that no good would be achieved5 5by attempting to re-invent the wheel. ... I have in
mind areas such as the law of contract.

In Kosmopoulos Wilson J., interestingly enough, was prepared to play
the role of (re)inventor. In Scott, her role was quite the opposite.
Wilson J.asked none of the questions one would have expected her to
ask, such as "why is the teenager listed as an insured?" Had she asked
this question, she would have found that the purpose of listing the
teenager was to protect his personal property.
The above quotation is a startling statement from Wilson J.
considering that her decision for the Court in Kosmopoulos was truly a
radical one. What the Court achieved in that case has not been achieved
in the United States or Great Britain. It was a change that had to be
made by legislation in Australia. 56 Yet, in Scott, Wilson J. put her name
to a purely formalistic opinion. It is also bizarre that a self-professed
champion of women's rights should, unwittingly, have destroyed the
wife's principal asset-her half-share in the home. Almost invariably,
the wife will be at a disadvantage in competing in the labour market
after her loss. 5 7 A wife is also prejudiced by the destruction of her
husband's property interest in a case like Scott. If she is the beneficiary
under his will, she will recover less. If the marriage breaks down, the
53

Ibid. at 319-30.

54 B. Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L..

507.
55

Ibid. at 515. For a good critique of Wilson J.'s views from a feminist corporate and tax
lawyer, see M. Maloney, "Economic Actors in The Work of Madame Justice Wilson" (1992) 15
Dalhousie L.J. 197.
56 See Insurance ContractsAct, 1984, Austl. Acts P. 1983, vol. 1,no. 80, s. 17.
57 See, for example, J.A. Fudge, "Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour

Law's Little Sister and the Feminization of Labour" (1991) 7 J.L. & Social Pol'y 73.
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husband will have less money with which to pay maintenance. These
(and other) dire consequences arise from viewing the law of contract as
being in a state of near perfection.58
b) DevelopmentsAfter Scott v. WawanesaInsurance Co.
In Peters (Trustee of) v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of
Canada,59 the husband set fire to the house he jointly owned with his
wife. At first instance, the trial Judge held that the wife had no
insurance claim, following the Scott case. The Court of Appeal for the
Northwest Territories held that a whole range of inquiries had to be
made including "were Mr. and Mrs. Peters both occupying the house on
the date of the fire? If not, when were they separated or divorced?" 60
The Court does not explain the significance of these findings. Perhaps,
if the trial Judge found in a new trial that the spouses were cohabiting,
Scott would apply, whereas, if they were divorced or separated, the
courts might seek to protect the wife's property. But this is only a guess.
One can understand the desire on the part of the lower courts to create
exceptions to unjust rules, but an uncertain rule combined with
exceptions of uncertain scope seems to offer the worst of both worlds.
III. NON-DISCLOSURE IN FIRE INSURANCE: FORD V.
DOMINION OF CANADA GENERAL INSURANCE CO.61
A. Introduction:Common Law Fraudv. EquitableFraud
In this section it will be necessary to distinguish between
common law fraud and its equitable counterpart. A fraudulent
statement at common law was defined in a series of cases stretching from
Pasley v. Freeman62 to Deny v. Peek63 and Nocton v. Ashburton.6 4 A
reasonable working definition of fraudulent misrepresentation (or
58

See the text accompanying supra note 55.

59 [1992] N.W.T.R. 193 (C.A.).
60/mbi at 196.
61 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 136 [hereinafter Ford].
62 (1789), 3 Term. Rep. 51, 100 E.R. 450 (K.B.).
63 (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.).
64 [1914] A.C. 932 (H.L.).
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deceit) was given by Cairns L.C. in Peek v. Gurney.65 For there to be
deceit, Cairns L.C. stated that:
be some active misstatement of fact, or, at allevents such a partial and
[T]here must ...
fragmentary statement of fact as6 that the withholding of which is not stated makes that
which is stated absolutely false.0

To this definition, there should be added two minor extensions. A
person who gives an opinion may incur liability for deceit, provided that
the statement of opinion is made with an intent to deceive another party
to her detriment.6 7 Finally, liability for deceit can be incurred solely by
conduct. If the seller of a home covers over serious cracks in the floors
or walls so as to mislead the purchaser into thinking that the house was
in good structural shape, this behaviour would be treated as common law
fraud.68
B. EquitableFraud
In the nineteenth century, the concept of "equitable fraud" also
existed. As my6 9colleague David Vaver says, this concept became a
"passe partout" for striking down unfair bargains where there had
been no fraud. Over time, some close relationship between the parties
was required so that the weaker party was protected unless he or she got
70
independent advice; these relationships include parent and child,
7 2 doctor and
guardian and ward, 7 1 religious adviser and disciple,
73 solicitor and client, 74 and trustee and cestui que trust.75
patient,

65 (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 377.
66

ibid. at 403.

67 "The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion": Edgington v.
Fitzmaurice (1885), 29 Ch.D. 459 at 483 (CA.), Bown LJ.
68
See, for example, Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash. S.C. 1960) [hereinafter Obde].
69 See his case comment on Smyth v. Szep (1992), 63 B.C.L.R. (2d) 52 (C.A.): "Unsettling

Settlements: Of Unconscionability and Other Things" (1992) 50 Advoc. 749 at 752.
70
Powell v. Powell (1899), [1900] 1 Ch. 243.
71 Taylor v. Johnston (1882), 19 Ch.D. 603.
72

Allcardv. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch.D. 145 (C.A.).

73 Williams v. Johnson, [1937] 4 All E.R. 34 (P.C.).
74

Wright v. Carter,[1903] 1 Ch. 27 (C.A.).

75 Thomson v. Eastwood (1877), 2 App. Cas. 215 (H.L.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 33 NO. 4

In other situations the court can hold, on the given facts, that a
bank, for example, exercised unfair power over an individual, so that the
contract becomes unenforceable. 76 This kind of pressure might be called
"fraud in equity" but, today, it is more likely to be said that the bank
owed a "fiduciary duty" to the customer 77 or guarantor, 78 or that there
was "inequality of bargaining power" such as to justify the court in
setting the contract aside.
This elementary statement of the law is necessary as an
introduction to trying to understand the term "fraudulent nondisclosure" in fire insurance, which is the language used in the Insurance
Act. 79 In other kinds of disclosure listed in the Insurance Act, for
example, life, 8 0 motor,8 1 and accident and sickness, 8 2 the word
"fraudulently" is not used.
If we say that "fraudulently" means making a dishonest
statement with intent to deceive,83 it might be argued that there can
never be a "fraudulent" non-disclosure. This, however, is not so.
Assume that an agent comes to inspect property that is seriously
damaged, but which the insured covers up so as to mislead the agent.
That would, in my view, be a fraudulent non-disclosure.8 4 Again, if an
insured attempted to procure insurance for a building that was already in
flames, a court would be justified in holding that the insured was liable
for fraudulent non-disclosure. Since insurance deals with uncertainties,
there is an implied representation that the building is not presently being
destroyed by fire.85
A good reason for giving "fraud," in the fire insurance section, its
common law meaning lies in the fact that it is common for insurers not
to use proposal forms when insuring a building against fire. The insurer
will often want to examine for itself the structure of the building, the
76

See, for example, Lloyd's Bank v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 (C.A.) [hereinafter Lloyd's Bank].

77 Woods v. MartinsBank, [1959] 1 Q.B. 55.
78
Lloyd's Bank, supranote 76.
79

See lnsuranceAct, supranote 21, s. 148(2).

80Ibid. s. 183.
81

1bid s. 233(4).

821bid. s. 308.
83

Such cases must, of necessity, be rare.

84 See Obde,supra note 68.
85 Ibis argument is similar to the one made by the respondents in Taylor v. London Assurance
Co., [1934] O.R. 273 (CA.) [hereinafter Taylor], but without success.
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number of sprinklers, and other features of the building. The effect of
this examination will be to reduce the scope of disclosure on the part of
the insured to vanishing point. Since 1934, "fraudulent non-disclosure"
has been given its common law meaning-the most recent Supreme
Court decision to the contrary notwithstanding.8 6 It is reasonable to
believe that if Canadian insurers were seriously troubled by having to
prove common law fraud, they would have pressured the government to
as they have done in the past
change the InsuranceAct accordingly,
87
whenever they needed to do so.
The first appellate court to consider the meaning of "fraudulent
non-disclosure" was the Ontario Court of Appeal in Kadishewitz v.
LaurentianInsurance Co. 88 In this case, the insurer refused to pay after
a fire. It alleged that the insured had failed to disclose: (1) a previous
loss by fire; (2) that the husband of the insured had been convicted of
robbery; (3) that the insured had served a term in jail; (4) that the
plaintiff had been engaged in business as a bootlegger; and two other
allegedly material facts. Five Judges held that even if all the facts were
true, the insurer could not avoid the policy because the insurer had not
been able to prove fraud. Before the ink was dry on the decision in
Kadishewitz, a differently constituted Court of Appeal in Taylor89 held, 3
to 2, that there was no need for the insurer to prove common law fraud.
In Taylor, Middleton J.A. relied on Greenwood v. Martins Bank,90 to the
effect that deliberate silence might amount to fraud. 91 Davis J.A. held
that the plaintiff had made an imperfect representation which he
equated with equitable fraud. Finally, Mulock C.J.A. stated that the
insurer need not prove common law fraud.
The Supreme Court of Canada, unanimously reversed the
Kadishewitz decision in an opinion given by Duff C.J. 92 The former
Chief Justice admitted that lawyers had always used "fraud" in a variety
of senses. 93 Lawyers had sometimes used fraud to describe a situation in
which the insured had failed to disclose a material fact. But in this case
86

See Ford,supra note 61.
See, for example, the changes made to the law of subrogation after the decision in Globe &
Rutgers FireInsurancev. Truedell (1927), 60 O.L.R. 227 (C.A.).
87

88 [1931] O.R. 529 (C.A.).
89

Supra note 85.

90 [1933] A.C. 51 at 57 (H.L).
91 Supra note 85 at 283-84.
92

Kadishewitz v. Laurentian InsuranceCo., [1935] S.C.R. 422 [hereinafter Kadishewitz].

93

Ibu.at 425.
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there was no reason for giving fraud any meaning other than its common
law meaning. On the facts of the case, there had been no fraud.
The Taylor case stood unchallenged for more than half a century.
Probably it is still the law, but its authority has been shaken by the
bizarre decision in Ford.94 In this case, Ford, the insured, applied for
fire insurance on his building. Though Ford did not realize it, there was
attached to the policy an application form filled out by someone else
(perhaps Keith, the insurer's agent), that stated that the plaintiff had
suffered no losses or cancellations. Keith stated that, just before
meeting with Ford, he had received a telephone call from someone
informing Keith that Ford had one loss and one cancellation. At first
instance,95 De Graves J. was very critical of Dominion's failure "to do an
internal check by consulting the Insurance Bureau. Probably these
checks would have revealed the plaintiff's insurance odysseys."'9 6 De
Graves J., however, continued: "[iun any event I find there was no
disclosure of the insurance fraud at Lundar. Even by the most loose
standards of an insurer, if disclosure had been made, the application
would have been denied."'97 Later, he stated: "[t]he law of insurance
requires complete disclosure. The doctrine of uberrimaefdei applies. 98
All this is, of course, impeccable English law. However, it is not
Canadian law.
The majority of the Court of Appeal, 99 Huband J.A. with
O'Sullivan J.A. concurring, held that in a new trial, the trial Judge could
reject Ford's claim either because: (1) Ford had committed arson or

94

Supra note 61.

95

Fordv. Dominion of Canada GeneralInsurance Co. (1988), 54 Man. R. (2d) 283 (Q.B.)
[hereinafter Ford Q.B.].
96
Ibid. at 289. Rendall and Stuesser are both critical of the insurer's failure to make inquiries
of the insured. See J.A. Rendall, Annotation (1989), 34 C.C.L.I. 224 at 225 (Man. Q.B.); and L.
Stuesser, "Review of Insurance Law in the 1990s" (1994) Man. .J. 250 at 261, where he writes:
Ford is not a sympathetic plaintiff; his actions reek of fraud. At the same time Dominion
is not an overly sympathetic defendant; its actions reek of negligence. Insurers are in the
business of risk assessment and surely it is not too much to ask for insurers to do some
investigation of a risk when put on notice as to potential problems. On the facts most
favourable to the insurer, Dominion was aware that Ford had a prior loss and a prior
cancellation. Surely a reasonable insurer would have probed these prior matters.
I agree with both writers, but am old fashioned enough to believe that applying a relevant
statute is better than a scramble across the often treacherous terrain of the common law.
97

FordQ.B., supra note 95 at 289.

98

1bid

99 Ford v. Dominion of Canada GeneralInsurance Co. (1989), 62 Man. R. (2d) 244 (C.A.)
[hereinafter FordC.A.].
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caused others to commit arson; and/or (2) because Ford had submitted
proofs of loss that were so inflated as to be fraudulent.
De Graves J.had not considered these grounds because, in his
view, Ford lost on the grounds of non-disclosure. Philp J.A. delivered a
separate concurring opinion that is breathtaking in its ignorance of the
law. He said:
This fundamental principle of insurance law has been applied by the Courts for over 200

years. The cases are referred to by Professor E.R. Hardy Ivamy in his text, General
at chapters 12 and 13. ... This is the principle that De
Principlesof InsuranceLaw ...

Graves J., applied in arriving at his conclusion that Ford failed to make full disclosure of
100
all material facts, and that, therefore, his policies of insurance were void.

The citation of a New Zealand text edited by an English author, to solve
a Canadian legal problem, is not without its charm. Unfortunately,
Ontario has a special statutory provision,101 to say nothing of a relevant
Supreme Court decision,102 to deal with the problem of disclosure in fire
insurance. Of these, Philp J.A. seems unaware. The insured appealed to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
The following judgment on the appeal was given on behalf of the
Supreme Court by Cory J.:
I am in agreement with the minority reasons given by Philp J.A..... As a result, I would
allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and restore the judgment at
trial. The appellant is entitled to its costs of this appeal and throughout these
10
proceedings. 3

Both the judgment of Philp J.A. and the Supreme Court
judgment areper incuriambecause neither mentions the relevant statute
or Supreme Court decision, but some lower courts might follow the
decision,104 since it is the last word on the subject. This state of affairs is
highly unsatisfactory. It is difficult to believe that some unfortunate
litigant will have to finance an action to re-establish the law as it has
been understood to be for nearly sixty years.

100 Ibd. at 249 [citations omitted].
101 See InsuranceAct,supra note 21, s. 148(1).
102 See Kadishewitz, supra note 92.

103 Ford,supra note 61 at 136.
104 Both lower courts and the Supreme Court are likely to say that the Ford decision "turns on

its own special facts."
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF INCREASE OF RISK: LEJEUNEV.
105
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETYINC.
While the law relating to the duty to disclose in fire insurance is
unfavourable to the insurer in Canadian law, 106 the law relating to
increase of risk is extremely favourable to it. An insurer can avoid
paying if it shows the risk insured has increased without its consent since
the policy issued, but in England this applies only if there has been a
drastic change in property use-for example, a change from residential
to business use.1 0 7 In Canadian law the test for increase of risk has been
recently stated in these terms:
Whether a change is material to the risk is a question of fact in each case. The question
is: if the change had been disclosed would it have influenced a reasonable insurer to
either decline or to have stipulated for a higher premium. 108

If the reader has a sense of ddj& vu, he or she is correct. This is the same
test for non-disclosure that the Supreme Court rejected in Taylor.10 9 By
making the question of increase of risk a question of fact, the insurer can
0
bring in considerations of "moral hazard. '11

105 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1048 [hereinafter Lejeune].
1 06

Seesupra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.

107 See, for example, Pollock C.B., who denied the insurer the right to complain of "a mere
increase in danger" in Baxendale v. Harvey (1859), 4 H. & N. 444, 157 E.R. 913 at 915 (Ex. Div.)
[hereinafter Baxendale]. Pollock C.B. observed:
It is like the case of a person who has an oven on his premises, and instead of using it for
baking bread he uses it for some other purpose. If a person who insures his life goes up
in a balloon, that does not vitiate his policy.... [Tlhe society having had notice of the
nature of the risk were not entitled to any notice by reason of the increase in danger. A
person who insures may light as many candles as he please[s] in his house, though each
additional candle increases the danger of setting the house on fire.
I am indebted to this and other references in K. Nicholson's excellent article "Mid-Term
Alterations in the Risk: What Can be done?" [1991] I.L.J. 27.
108 Lewandowski v. Waterloo Mutual Insurance Co. (1985), 12 C.C.L.I. 288 at 292 (Ont.
H.C.J.), affd [1987] I.LR. 8627 (Ont. CA.) [hereinafterLewandowski].
1 09

Supra note 85.
110 The notion of moral hazard is based on a simplistic theory of moral behaviour which posits
that the promise or expectation of a benefit conditioned on the happening of an event generates
incentives for the potential beneficiary to cause that event to occur, or to claim that it has occurred.
Thus, over valuation of insured property is taken as evidence that the insured intends to destroy the
property.
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Moreover, having rejected the ordinary duty of disclosure at the
formation level in fire insurance contracts 1 the doctrine is imported at
a later stage in the fire insurance contract. There is even less
justification for imposing a duty of disclosure on the insured during the
currency of the policy than there is at the formation stage. At the
formation stage the applicant may be alerted by the agent or by a
statement in the proposal form that there might be something that he or
she should reveal. 112 Once the policy has been issued, however, there is
nothing to alert the insured that she will have to disclose, for example,
that she has started to smoke, had a child with her partner, or had taken
in an elderly relative. 113 Indeed, were insurance companies to insist on
getting this information, they would find themselves swamped by it.
The kind of inquiry that is currently needed is illustrated by the
recent case of Lewandowski.1 14 In this case the wife, who had a joint
interest in the home, left the house with her child because of her
husband's alleged alcoholism. After the property had burned down, the
husband made a claim. The insurer denied the claim because of the
husband's alcoholism and because of his failure to disclose the fact that
his wife had left the farm. Callaghan J. found that, although the
husband had been drunk on a number of occasions, he was not an
alcoholic. The Judge found that the husband was able to take care of
the farm. 115 This fact was able to dispose also of the insurer's argument
that he had not disclosed the fact that his wife had left him.116 While the
case has a happy ending, it is a disgrace that a case like this should
require four days of hearing into evidence that is 'highly subjective and
has little to do with the doctrine of increase of risk as properly
understood. Since what was insured was a farm, questions relating to
the severity of the husband's drinking problem and the fact that the wife
left the farm should have been entirely irrelevant to the court. If each
judge can balance the factors referred to in Lewandowski, this could

111 See Taylor, supra note 85, for an interpretation of "fraudulent omission" in a predecessor
of InsuranceAct,supra note 21, s. 148(2), stat. cond. 1.

112 Even though proposal forms are not generally used in fire insurance inspections, oral
questions may be used.
113 See the statement of Pollock C.B., supra note 107.
114

Supra note 108.

115 ibid. at 291-92.
1 16

Ibid. at 291. For an increase of risk to occur, the change in the risk must be within the
"control" of the insured: see InsuranceAct, supra note 21, s. 148(2), stat. cond. 4. It is impossible to
see how the wife's desertion could be under the "control" of the husband.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 33 No. 4

easily mean that another judge hearing the same evidence might have
decided the case differently from Callaghan J.
This proposition is forcefully illustrated by the decision of Scott
D.C.J. in Doherty v. Home Insurance Co.,11 7 decided one year after
Lewandowski. In Doherty, Mr. Doherty insured his home at 56 Briar
Knoll, Kitchener, with the Maplex Insurance Company. Later, Doherty
and his fiance6, Lebon, bought a house in their joint names at Rothsay
Drive, Kitchener. Doherty telephoned his agent, Durocher, to arrange
insurance coverage for the newly purchased house. He informed
Durocher that Lebon might live at Rothsay, but after they were married,
she would be living at Briar Knoll and they might rent Rothsay. The
agent placed insurance with the Home Insurance Company. After the
couple married, the Rothsay house was rented to a family named Day
with their two children. While the Day family was in occupation of the
house, a freak fire occurred without negligence on their part.
Home Insurance argued that they would not insure rented
residential premises unless the owner insured his principal residence
with them-which was not the case here. The philosophy behind this is
that the tenant, having no pride of ownership, has no financial interest
and takes less care of the premises than the owner would. The insured
argued that there had been no increase in risk relying on the decision in
Ryan v. Citadel GeneralAssurance Co.118 In that case, the plaintiff, a
tenant, had insured the contents of the house. At the time, he was living
there with his wife and child. His wife left him, taking the child, and he
was joined by two male friends as paying guests. After the fire had
occurred, the insurer refused to pay on the ground that there had been a
material change of risk in that the house was no longer used as a "single
family dwelling." In Ryan, Smith J. rejected the insurer's argument
emphatically:
I am not persuaded that a reasonable insurer would or should consider occupancy more
hazardous when a man and a woman are in a common law relationship for instance or for
that matter when two males and two females with or without sexual content in their
relationship occupy a single-family dwelling together. It would be straining the concept
of reasonableness to define the risk in those terms given today's societal attitudes. The
materiality of a change along the lines just described is not self-evident.119

117 (1985), 14 C.C.L.I. 104 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [hereinafter Doherty Dist. Ct.], rev'd (1987), 19
C.C.L.I. 314 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Dohery Div. Ct. ].
118 (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 586 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter Ryan].
119

Ibid. at 591.
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In Doherty Dist. Ct., Scott D.C.J. refused to accept the Ryan case since, in
that case, Ryan was still living in the premises and the insured contents
were still there. In Doherty, only one of the owners of the Rothsay house
lived there briefly; the house was occupied by tenants.
Scott D.C.J. rejected the insurer's argument without appearing
to require evidence from other insurers relating to increase of risk. She
wrote:
It would be contrary to reason to say that there was no material change in the risk when
is nothing unreasonable in
the property was rented and the tenants moved in. There
12 0

Home's policy not to insure rented residential property.

Even if Home Insurance had this policy, it was not demonstrated that
other "prudent insurers" followed it. The Divisional Court, in an
opinion by O'Brien J., reversed the decision on precisely this ground:
There was no evidence, statistical or otherwise, to support this conclusion. There was no

evidence that this was a view generally (or reasonably) held in the insurance industry....
Home's refusal was not an absolute one, they would insure rental property ifthe principal
residence were also insured with them. This would appear to be a marketing rather than

an underwriting decision.

121

Again, the outcome is satisfactory but it should not have taken three
years and an appeal to reach an obvious result. The doctrine of increase
of risk as understood in these and other cases bears no relation to the
doctrine as understood in England, 122 Australia,123 or New Zealand.12 4
Why Canada should have a doctrine in this area that is particularly
favourable to insurers is beyond comprehension.
All of this is by way of prelude to the remarkable, unanimous
Supreme Court decision in Lejeune. 25s Although the appeal is from
126
Quebec, the law is identical to that in other common law provinces,

120 Doherty Dist. Ct., supranote 117 at 113.
121 Doherty Div. Ct., supra note 117 at 317 [emphasis in original]. The court relied extensively

on M.G. Baer, Annotation (1985), 14 C.C.L.I. 104 at 106.
122 See Barendale,supra note 107; see also Pim v. Reid (1843), 6 Man. & G. 1, 134 E.R. 784
(C.P.); and Beauchamp v.NationalMutualInsurance Co. (1937), 57 Lloyd's Rep. 272 (KB.).
123 See, for example, Wilshire v. GuardianAssurance Co. (1912), 15 C.L.R. 516 (Aust. H.C.);

and Southern Cross Assurance Co. v. Australian ProvincialAssurance Ltd. (1939), 39 S.R. 174
(N.S.W.S.C.).
124 See Dawson v. Monarch Insurance (1976), [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 372 (S.C. Christchurch).

125 Supra note 105.
126 See InsuranceAct, supra note 21, ss. 148(2) (property), 234(1) (motor vehicle), and 290329 (accident and sickness).
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with a few immaterial exceptions! 27 The insured, the owner of a four
apartment buildings, leased the large premises on the ground floor to
the Maison des Jeunes Inc., a group of young people aged between
fourteen and eighteen years. In January 1981, a fire started in the
ground floor hallway destroying the building. The insurer refused to
indemnify the insured because the building was no longer occupied as a
"private dwelling." At first blush, this decision seems incredible. Had
the insured leased an apartment to children doing their homework or
studying for exams for a few hours a day, it would seem inconceivable
that anyone would describe this as a change in the use of the premises,
so as to render the property no longer a "private dwelling." Further, if
the doctrine of increase of risk is to be given any sensible meaning, it is
impossible to say that there hag been an "increase in risk" so as to defeat
the insured's claim.
Indeed, C6t6 A.C.J. held that the expert witnesses were not
agreed as to whether there had been an increase of risk. Unable to use
this ground, the Judge denied recovery on the basis that the lease to the
Maison des Jeunes changed the character of the "private dwelling."
C6t6 A.C.J. did not say what the property had become after it had lost
its character as a "private dwelling." 128 A majority of the Quebec Court
of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's judgment by a majority of 2 to
1.129 LeBel J.A. (with whom Beauregard J.A. concurred) thought that
the lease of the premises had not changed the character of the insured
building. The insurer had not defined what it meant by "private
dwelling" and the activities of the Maison des Jeunes were no different
from the gatherings that might occur in any family having young people
at home.
The factums to the Supreme Court for both appellant and
respondent concerned themselves solely with the question of increase of
risk. De Grandpr6 points out that Gonthier J. spends ten of his eleven
page opinion discussing the doctrine of increase of risk only to find it
inapplicable. In a single page, the Supreme Court decides that the use
by the Maison des Jeunes is inconsistent with the description of the
premises as a "private dwelling." De Grandpr6 notes that no authorities
are cited in the single-page judgment, and states that Gonthier J.'s
127

The Quebec statute is based on the French law of 1930; it allows the owner of property to
recover a proportionate amount of the loss, unless the insured is guilty of bad faith: see An Act to
amend the Act respecting insurance and to again amend the Civil Code, S.Q. 1979, c. 33, amending
R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-32, arts. 2566, 2488, and 2500.
128 Lejeune v. Cumis Insurance Society Ina, [1985] C.S. 608 at 612.
129 [1988] R.J.Q. 1 (CA.).
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opinion "m'a fort d6sappoint6."130 While de Grandpr6 is shocked by the
style of this ramshackle opinion,131 I am disturbed by the implications of
the decision. The Supreme Court, in my view, is giving the go-ahead to
any court that cannot find any increase of risk, to find a prohibited use of
the premises, even if one cannot find that prohibited use on any sensible
reading of the policy. One can only hope that Lejeune is relegated to
obscurity.
V. CONCLUSION
Fire insurance cases are not the most important problem in the
Canadian legal universe. However, one should not underestimate their
importance to the individuals who are denied protection by shoddy
opinions that pay no regard to statutes, binding authority, or sensible
public policies. Despite the thousands of pages that have been written
by eminent jurists and judges on the importance of not depriving an
insured of coverage, in the absence of a compelling social policy, the
Supreme Court appears not to have read this vast literature. De
Grandpr6 offers three explanations for "cette situation d6sesp6rante":13 2
(1) that judges do not have the background to write with authority in
insurance law; (2) that judges are bewitched (m6dusfs)133 by the writings
of university academics; and (3) that many judgments are written by law
clerks fresh out of law school.
To take the second explanation first, it is difficult to see how the
judges could become befuddled by the one Canadian text available in
English,134 since that treatise.does not advance novel ideas for the
judges. It substantially records what the Canadian law is. If the judges
looked more often at American authorities, 135 they would write better
opinions since American judges and commentators have a deeper
understanding of insurance law than their Canadian or English
counterparts.
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Supra note 49 at 23.

131 Ibid
132 Ibi. at 40.
133 Ibid.
13 4

See C. Brown & J. Menezes, InsuranceLaw in Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1991).
135 This was the strength of Laskin CJ.'s decisions in the area of insurance law.
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It is true that law clerks and counsel are weak in their grasp of
insurance to the point of ignoring relevant statutes,13 6 but the reason for
this ignorance comes from the disgraceful neglect of insurance in law
schools. The subject does not appear in the list of specialties set out in
the 1994-95 Canadian teachers' handbook. Some law schools do not
teach the subject at all; others teach property insurance, neglecting life
and disability insurance. Other students regard it as part of contracts
and they fail to study a subject that has its own special vocabulary and is
as complex as, say, constitutional law, which every Canadian student is
required to take.
There is one final complicating factor and that is the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms.137 Since the Supreme Court regards this
as its most essential work, questions of insurance law tend to be
regarded by the justices, the academics, and the law clerks as relatively
insignificant. Yet it is difficult to see why a trivial case such as Andrews
v. Law Society of B.C.13 8 is more important than, for example, Scott.139 If
the Court is going to continue to hear insurance cases, it must be
prepared to devote the same care to them that it devotes to Charter
cases. Unless it does this, the public will be better served by the court's
not hearing these cases at all. These cases are too important to be
regarded as a "breather" from the court's real work.140
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See Ford,supra note 61. A student in an examination paper gave me fourteen examples of
where the courts had ignored insurance statutes. All of them were correct.
13 7

Part I of the ConstitutionAc4 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
138 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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Supra note 3.

140 After this article was written, I read L. Cunningham's fine article, "The Right of an
Innocent Co.-Insured Spouse to recover under a 'Joint' Insurance Policy" (1994) 8 Otago L. Rev.
169. The author shows that, until recently, the New Zealand courts refused to protect the property
rights of an innocent, co-insured spouse. However, in Maulder v. NationalInsurance Co. of New
Zealand Ltd. (1992), [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 351 (H.C. Wellington), an innocent widow was entitled to
recover half the value of the family home which her husband had burnt down when he killed
himself.

